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Abstract 
This paper investigated the relationship between players’ wages and sport 
performance in the Italian top professional football league - Serie A. The analysis 
focused on 14 seasons from 2001/2002 to 2014/2015. Findings show that aggregate 
wage expenditure is a robust predictor of success for Italian professional football 
teams. We first exploited a fixed-effects panel data and eventually we have addressed 
the problem of endogeneity by providing a dynamic IV specification of the model. 
Based on the System-GMM framework, we employed a model including lagged terms 
of dependent variables and covariates as instruments to control for endogeneity as 
well as alternative exogenous instruments to control for geographical/environmental 
factors and for socio-economic factors that could be the actual predictors of 
performance through an indirect effect on payroll.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sport performance depends on a wide range of determinants, but the most 
important factor is undoubtedly the availability and access to talent. 
Conventionally, a reasonable way to approximate talent is given by monetary value. 
The paper explores the relationship between success in Italian professional football 
top league, Serie A, and the aggregate payroll of players. In order to do that, in 
what follows we apply three alternative measures for success and controlling for a 
wide set of covariates that are supposed to be related to sport performance. 
To perform the analysis we collected data for 39 Italian professional football 
teams of Serie A tournaments (from season 2001/02 to 2014/15). The analysis is 
made of two steps. First, we test whether aggregate wage is a robust determinant of 
sport performance by means of a static panel estimation. Secondly, since the 
current level of aggregate wage is likely to be endogenous in the past realizations of 
the dependent variable (through increased revenues due to successful 
performances), in the second step we apply an IV dynamic panel model. The 
exogenous instruments chosen are supposed to influence socio-economic unobserved 
factors which eventually turn to have an impact on teams’ likelihood of sport 
success. In sum, our approach combines alternative estimation techniques (Fixed-
Effects and System-GMM) in order to assess the robustness of the results, and in 
particular to directly tackle endogeneity.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 surveys the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes data, and section 4 outlines the estimation strategy and results 
of our two-steps analysis, including both fixed-effects and dynamic panel data 
instrumental variable specifications. Finally, in the last section we present some 
concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESS IN FOOTBALL 
 
This paper contributes to a large literature on team sport success. In a considerable 
set of studies it turns out that the probability of sport success is positively 
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associated with teams’ talent availability. In particular, since the seminal 
contributions of El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) and Scully (1974) the winning ratio 
between two teams has always been associated with the relative available talent, 
whose better proxy is considered, with few exemptions [Franck and Nüesch (2010, 
2011)], the payroll. Along these lines, Fort and Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995), 
Késenne (2000), Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Szymanski and Smith (1997), Hall 
et al. (2002), Burger and Walters (2003), Frick (2007), Berri and Schmidt (2010), 
Rodríguez et al. (2013), Frick (2013) and Szymanski (2013), among the others, have 
employed the talent ratio to compare the competitive balance equilibria inside 
professional team sports leagues.  
Needless to say, in such a view, uncertainty of sport contest appears to be 
small. In fact, the outcome of tournaments can be easily predicted ex-ante at the 
beginning of each season. Albeit such a mechanism appears to be clear-cut and 
unchallenged, it might be also noted that a more complex complementarity 
mechanism is in place (Hall et al., 2002). In fact, a winning team increases its 
revenues through a variety of channels (monetary prizes, participation in 
continental competitions, match attendance, TV rights): since new revenues are 
generally spent in extra talent, this mechanism could be a source of further sport 
success and therefore it could lead to the creation and preservation of teams 
‘dynasties’.  
In addition, in the existing literature, few studies investigate the determinants 
of sport performance in the Italian Serie A. The first attempt is that of Di Betta and 
Amenta (2010); it focuses on the ‘tradition’ as the main factor in determining 
football success in Serie A; the authors consider two measures of 
success/performance: (i) a team’s historical ranking; (ii) the number of points 
achieved in each season in the Italian first division. The empirical analysis, that 
covers the period 1929-2009, shows that Serie A is characterized by a “self-
reinforcing mechanism” of supremacy. This implies that only ten teams do 
represent the ‘aristocracy’ of Italian football. Moreover, Szymanski (2004) considers 
payrolls and final standings of 27 Italian teams playing in Serie A and B from 1987 
and 2001. He finds that in Serie A and B in 62% of cases an increase (decrease) in 
the payroll translated into a better (worse) position in the final standing. In 
addition, the author compares data on final standing and payroll of Italian 
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professional teams competing in Serie A and B with those of 29 English teams 
playing in Premier League and in First Division from 1991 to 2001. It emerges a 
strong association between the two variables, without relevant cross-country 
differences. The only remarkable difference is that the payroll distribution among 
teams is able to explain the variability of seasonal performances of Italian teams 
more than the English teams do. In fact, the R-squared associated to the 
relationships payroll-final position in standing in Italy is .93, while it is .82 for the 
English context. Szymanski (2004, 161) supports the idea that, in the period under 
investigation, Italian teams competing in the first two divisions, obtained “more or 
less” what they have paid for. 
The analysis on the payroll-performance relationship for the Italian context 
was also in Simmons and Forrest (2004) and Forrest and Simmons (2002). In the 
first, the authors investigate the relationship for English, German and Italian 
championships, for different time spans, testing for the hypothesis if the increase in 
the wages spending enhances sport performance.  
 In particular, findings show that Italian teams – from 1987 to 1999 – have 
enhanced on-field performances by increasing relative payroll, but at decreasing 
rate, such as in the English context. Forrest and Simmons (2002) compare the 
points ratio elasticity to wages in the season 1995/96 with that of the season 
2001/02. Interestingly, the elasticities of points ratio and payroll, at the sample 
mean, were .4 and .2 in the seasons 1995/96 and 2001/02, respectively. The decline 
of the elasticity is explained by the free agency of players after the Bosman ruling.  
Moreover, the Italian context appears to be atypical in the analysis of Frick 
(2013). The author collected a data set from 13 European leagues for three seasons 
(2006/07, 2008/09, and 2010/11), in order to make an econometric comparative 
analysis of the impact of team aggregate wage on position gained in the final 
standing. The dependent variable is the position in the final standing of team i in 
season j – weighted by the strength of team’s national league.The main explanatory 
variable is the log of wage bill of team i in season j relative to European average.  
Results show that the impact of relative payroll on weighted league position is 
negative and statistically significant for all countries with the exception of Italy.  
Our paper provides a novel contribution in two ways: i) it combines different 
streams of the literature on sport success, analysing a variety of factors searching 
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for the best predictor of teams’ performances; ii) it adopts a variety of estimation 
techniques (Fixed-Effect and System-GMM). The latter contribution is particularly 
important as it provides a novel attempt to tackle endogeneity and to assess the 
direction of the causal nexus in the wage/performance relationship. 
 
 
3. THE DATA SET 
 
The dataset includes information about Italian football top league championships 
(Serie A) from season 2001/02 to 2014/15. The Italian Serie A is an open league 
composed by 20 teams.1 At the end of each season the three bottom teams relegate 
in the lower division (Serie B), being replaced by the best three teams of Serie B. In 
sum, the dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of 39 teams.  
The dependent variable does proxy performance and success of teams. It is analysed 
at seasonal level, by means of a measure based on teams’ ranking positions at the 
end of each season, which is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = −𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑡+1−𝑃𝑖,𝑡
], 
 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the position of team 𝑖 at the end of season 𝑡 and 𝑁𝑡 is the number of 
teams competing in season 𝑡.2 This formulation was suggested by Szymanski and 
Smith (1997) for the English context, and successively applied by Szymanski (2004) 
to Italian championships; it emphasizes the gap between teams positioned in the 
top or in the bottom of the final standing with respect to the same gap between 
team positioned in the middle. Higher values of rank implies better performance. 
Following Franck and Nüesch (2011) we also employ an alternative measure of 
success built on the percentage of points achieved by each team ( 𝑖 ) in each 
tournament (𝑡):  
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
, 
                                                          
1 For details about the organization of Italian Serie A see Baroncelli and Caruso (2011).  
2 Note that Serie A seasons 2001/02, 2002/03, and 2003/04, enrolled 18 teams; since 2004/05 Serie A 
has enrolled  20 teams.  
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where 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 is the maximum points achievable in season 𝑡. The two alternative 
variables adopted to capture sport success are strongly correlated (0.964). 
As noted above the payroll can be assumed to proxy the available talent of 
each team. Data on wages are collected from the annual report of La Gazzetta dello 
Sport which provides total wage expenditure of each Serie A team. 3  In our 
estimations, we converted current aggregate wages in 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 (constant €/2014) 
by using the consumer price index (CPI) provided by the Italian Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). 
A second independent variable ( 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 ) counts the number of 
participations of each team in Serie A since 1929, including the season under 
investigation. The introduction of 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 acknowledges the role of tradition and 
experience in explaining long run performances of Italian teams, as emerged in 
previous empirical works. We include five other covariates; as in Bucciol et al. 
(2014) and Yamamura (2015) we introduce the average age of team players, and in 
order to consider potential not linear relationship, we also use it squared (𝑎𝑔𝑒 and 
𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑). Moreover, as suggested by Bryson et al. (2014) we also include the 
share of foreigners players (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠), searching for potential superstar effect. 
Again, as in Franck and Nüesch (2011) we consider the total number of players in 
the roster, including both the linear and squared term (𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 and 𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑), 
to account for a possible non-linear relationship: in fact, the size of roster can be 
positively associated to sport success, by approximating the total team's availability 
of talent, up to a threshold, since then the effect reverses, due to the concurring 
detrimental effect on coach's decisions and to the difficult management of locker 
room's dynamics. Data are drawn from the Almanacco Illustrato del Calcio – Panini 
that provides information about rosters, fixtures and results of all Italian 
professional championships. The Almanacco includes details about players, such as 
age, nationality, and career. Finally, since the 2004/2005 season the total number of 
teams taking part to the Serie A has been increased to 20, rather than 18, we also 
include a dummy variable, labelled 18_𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠 , that takes the value of unity in 
seasons characterized by 18 teams. Descriptive statistics are in Table 1. 
                                                          
3 Missing data have been provided by Giambattista Rossi . 
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Table 1- Descriptive statistics of main variable 
 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
rank 274 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 1.493 -2.996 2.996 
log_points_pct 274 0.453 0.421 0.141 0.127 0.895 
real wages 274 44.638 24.189 43.610 8.477 190.400 
aristocracy 274 41.441 41.500 27.274 1 83 
age 274 26.526 26.52 1.378 22.85 30.56 
foreigners 274 0.409 0.415 0.187 0.04 0.893 
roster 274 27.328 27 2.484 21 37 
 
 
4. MODEL IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
 
A core issues in estimating the effect of payroll on sport performance is given by 
endogeneity and potential simultaneous causality. As mentioned above, Hall, 
Szymanski and Zimbalist (2002) highlight this issue in an effort to determine a 
causal relationship between payroll and sport performance; they find that payroll 
actually Granger-causes sport performance in English soccer in the period 1974-
1999. However, this result does not fully tackle the endogeneity issues implied in 
the relationship between wage and sport performance. In particular, one team’s 
successful performance in the current season is likely to affect its overall wage bill 
in the following season: therefore, current level of payroll has to be considered 
endogenous with respect to past realizations of sport success. A further problem is 
given by the relative inertia of sport performance, i.e. the fact that, ceteris paribus, 
current year performance is likely to be affected by last season’s results. Therefore, 
the identification strategy for estimating the effect of wage on success needs to be 
included in a dynamic setting. For this reason, in this paper we adopt a set of 
alternative estimation techniques in order to account for the dynamic setting of the 
model. The baseline model is constructed starting from the following specification: 
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1log (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2log (𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3log(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4[log (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡)]
2 + 𝛽5log (𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6log (𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7[log(𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡)]
2 + 𝛽818_𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (1) 
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where, 𝜇𝑖 is a team-specific time-invariant term, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the usual stochastic error 
term. All covariates are logged, so the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of 
elasticity. The results of the the Hausman test allows to conclude that the inclusion 
of fixed-effect is preferable, therefore they are included in the model.4  On the 
opposite, the appropriate Wald test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis of 
joint nullity of time-fixed effects (seasonal-dummies), 5  that therefore are not 
included in the model. As a starting point for our analysis we exploit the within-
transformation to implement Fixed-Effect OLS (FE), in order to control for 
unobserved time-invariant factors: thus, the table presenting estimation results 
always provides FE estimations in the first column. However, in our dynamic 
setting, since past realizations of 𝑦𝑖  can influence present realizations of 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖, the time-invariant factor (𝜇𝑖) is correlated with 𝑦𝑖,𝑡, thus introducing a 
dynamic bias in the model that cannot be solved through the demeaning process of 
within-transformation in FE estimation (Nickell, 1981). This feature of the 
relationship can be explicitly modelled by including the lagged value of the 
dependent variable. In this way, we are acknowledging that some inertia occurs in 
the sport success dynamics: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜋𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1log (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2log (𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3log (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4[log(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡)]
2 +
𝛽5log(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6log (𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7[log(𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡)]
2+ 𝛽818_𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. (2) 
 
Here, the inclusion of 𝜋𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 makes the dynamic bias more evident. The within-
transformation usually applied in the fixed-effect framework, introduces a bias in 
the estimates, since the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term. 
In order to provide a first solution to this problem, we implement a Fixed-Effect 
model with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), including an AR1 
autocorrelation structure (PSAR1). This technique allows for standard errors to be 
heteroskedastic and correlated across panels, while at the same time accounting for 
first order autocorrelation within panels.   
                                                          
4 The chi-square statistics for the full model specification is 44.99, that allows for rejection of the null 
hypothesis with p<0.01.  
5 The F statistic is .46, hence the null hypothesis of joint nullity of all the season-specific dummies 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
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Finally, a System-GMM model is implemented in order to tackle autocorrelation 
and endogeneity at the same time. System-GMM includes a first-difference 
transformation that sorts out the constant term and the time-invariant team-
specific term: 
 
 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝜋𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1∆log(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2∆log (𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3∆log (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4∆[log (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡)]
2 +
𝛽5∆log(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6∆log (𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7∆[log(𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡)]
2 +  𝛽8∆18_𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  (3) 
 
First-differencing removes all constant terms, in particular the team-specific 
unobserved term.6 Therefore, an instrumental variable technique is now feasible. 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), all the independent variables (taken as 
endogenous) are instrumented by their own available lags in level (up to 2). In the 
System-GMM framework, both the level and the differenced equation are 
instrumented using lags.  
The instrumentation illustrated so far exploits all the information available 
within the dataset in order to sort out potential endogeneity. Finally, clustered 
robust standard errors are always included in the estimation, in order to allow for 
within-team correlation of residuals. Furthermore, in order to strengthen our 
analysis, we have developed an identification strategy to include “standard” 
exogenous instruments in both equations, as well as the lags of independent 
variables. Clearly, in this case, the standard IV exclusion restrictions must hold: 
i.e., the instrumental variables that are excluded from the second stage estimation 
must be exogenous and correlated with our measure for payroll. 
We identified two exogenous instruments (following common IV-technique’s 
notation hereafter we referred to these instruments as “excluded instruments”, since 
they are excluded from the main equation) in order to account for potential deep 
determinants of wages that are not related to sport performance. In particular, 
payroll can be determined by either environmental conditions, socio-economic 
factors or both. These indirect effects are channelled through the economic potential 
of the area in which the hometown is set since more developed/rich areas are more 
                                                          
6 As a further robustness check, first-differencing is also applied to PCSE estimator (PSAR1-FD) 
when presenting the main results. 
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likely to sustain successful sport teams in the long-run. Therefore, we used the 
following exogenous instruments (both logged) to proxy for geographical and socio-
economic conditions: 
a) the average altitude of the hometown (log_alt). This instrument is used to 
proxy the weather and more general environmental conditions of the hometown, as 
potential determinants for economic and social activity, that in turn is likely to 
affect the chances that the local football team enjoys strong economic support. 
Higher altitudes are usually associated to more extreme weather conditions as well 
as to geographical settings that can hinder the development of economic activities. 
Furthermore, large-sized enterprises are more prone to settle in lowlands rather 
than in highlands. This is especially true in Italy where the largest part of the 
terrain is mountainous and industrial clusters are by far located in flatlands. 
Therefore, it is more likely that a favourable environment for economic activity 
occurs in lowlands, where, in turn, it is likely to affect local football teams’ financial 
strength: directly, through local entrepreneurs willing to invest in the team; 
indirectly, through merchandise and match attendance. This in turn will affect 
teams’ payroll. For these reasons, we believe that altitude is a valid exogenous 
proxy to capture geographical burdens for economic activity that indirectly 
influence teams’ payroll. 
b) the number of total extortions (log_ext) reported to the public authority in the 
region where the team is hosted. It can be interpreted as a proxy of the social and 
institutional environment that team owners have to face when they decide to invest 
in the area. While log_alt relates to the physical geographical burdens on economic 
activity that indirectly affect payroll, log_ext is assumed to capture the burden to 
local economic development due to criminal activity. In fact, it can discourage 
entrepreneurs to invest in the area. Following the same rationale presented above, 
where the social cost of establishing economic activity (approximated by the number 
of reported extortions) is higher, the detrimental effect discouraging entrepreneurs 
to invest in the area will in turn depress the chances of higher payroll for local 
football teams7. 
                                                          
7 Caruso (2011) analyzes the relationship between crime and sport in Italy.  
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The validity of our excluded instruments requires exogeneity and relevance to 
hold. Both assumptions are tested adopting the appropriate tests after model 
estimations. However, we provide further evidence that our instruments are 
conceptually valid in two further ways: (1) by analysing the reduced forms and (2) 
by inspecting the correlation matrix of relevant variables.  
Firstly, in order to test the absence of a direct effect of our chosen exogenous 
instruments on sport success we estimated the following reduced form of our 
models: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛼𝑖 + 𝜑𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾2log (𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾3log(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾4[log (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡)]
2 + 𝛾5log(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛾6log(𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾7[log(𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡)]
2 + 𝛾8(18𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡.    (4) 
 
where 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡  represents the two instrumental variables, 𝛼𝑖  is the team-specific 
constant term; 𝛾1 … 𝛾8 are the parameters to be estimated; 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 is the random error 
component. All the other variables are the same as in (1).  
In order to test the strength of our instruments we analyse a reduced form 
equation in which log_alt and log_ext directly enter the estimated model of sport 
success in the first stage: in other words, we implement a fixed-effect model in 
which the dependent variable is sport performance and log_alt and log_ext are 
included among the covariates. The statistical significance of the coefficients 
associated to these variables would show the direct effect of geographical and socio-
cultural proxies on sport success, providing evidence against the validity of our 
excluded instruments, and that should be indeed included in the main model.  
The results of the reduced form estimations for the full sample are in Table 2, 
for both instrumental variables and proxies of sport success (rank and 
log_points_pct). The coefficients associated to the instrumental variables, when 
directly included in the regression, are never significant: therefore, we can exclude 
the existence of a statistically significant direct association between our chosen 
instruments and our dependent variable, and conclude that log_alt and log_ext can 
be reasonably used as exogenous instruments to sort out potential endogeneity in 
our main independent variable, namely payroll. 
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Table 2- Reduced forms  
Dep. var. rank points_pct 
Instrumental var.: 
 
log_alt log_ext log_alt log_ext 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
instrumental var. 0.132 -0.118 0.029 -0.046 
 
(0.098) (0.163) (0.027) (0.049) 
lagged dep. var. 0.379*** 0.368*** 0.278*** 0.275*** 
 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.101) (0.101) 
aristocracy 0.403** 0.412*** 0.070** 0.072** 
 
(0.164) (0.171) (0.049) (0.050) 
age -6.319 -16.03 -12.27 -12.18 
 
(68.91) (71.56) (17.77) (17.83) 
age squared 1.204 2.747 1.930 1.928 
 
(10.60) (11.01) (2.717) (2.724) 
foreigners 0.237 0.246 0.027 0.033 
 
(0.192) (0.199) (0.046) (0.047) 
roster  -66.32*** -65.05** -12.20* -11.90* 
 
(24.33) (24.35) (4.758) (4.803) 
roster sq.  9.585*** 9.417** 1.758* 1.714* 
 
(3.646) (3.651) (0.712) (0.719) 
18_teams YES YES YES YES 
Observations 212 212 212 212 
Teams 33 33 33 33 
Seasons 14 14 14 14 
Team FE YES YES YES YES 
Adj R-Sq. overall 0.512 0.505 0.477 0.458 
All variables are logged. Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
Level of statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
 
Furthermore, we examined the matrix of covariance of our excluded and included 
variables. In particular, we focused on the correlation between our chosen 
instrumental variables and our main explanatory variable, i.e. wage, in order to 
exert the relevance of our instruments: in fact, the lack of correlation between the 
endogenous variable and its chosen instrument can severely bias the estimation of 
the structural model (Woolridge, 2010). As Table 3 shows, firstly, the correlation 
coefficients that describe the relationship between our excluded instruments and 
our measure of sport success are always statistically significant; secondly they are 
always larger than the pairwise correlation coefficients of the IV/Dep. Var. 
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correlation coefficients. Therefore, the relevance of our chosen instrumental 
variable is supported by data evidence.8 
 
Table 3- Pairwise correlation of instrumental variables, dependent variables and main explanatory variable. 
 
  
Excluded IV rank log_points_pct log_real_wages 
Extortion (log_ext) 0.174*** 0.184*** 0.352*** 
Altitude (Log_alt) 0.188*** 0.209*** 0.232*** 
Note: *** indicates 1% level of statistical significance 
 
Then we implement a System-GMM model in which the dependent variable and the 
main explanatory variables (i.e. our endogenous variables) are instrumented with 2 
period lags. In addition, a set of exogenous instruments are also included in the 
model. Table 4 shows the results.  
 
Table 4-The effect of payroll on sport performance in the Italian Serie A league 
Dep. Var: rank (2001/02 - 2014/15) 
Model FE PCSE SYS-GMM 
  
PSAR1 PSAR1- FD exog. endog. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
real_wages 0.589* 0.565*** 0.553** 0.634* 0.831*** 
 
(0.320) (0.216) (0.260) (0.383) (0.190) 
lagged dep. var. 0.152 0.108 -0.254** 0.301* 0.347*** 
 
(0.0916) (0.124) (0.111) (0.170) (0.077) 
aristocracy -0.872** -0.794*** -1.672** 0.223 0.096 
 
(0.424) (0.229) (0.816) (0.189) (0.128) 
age 78.53 129.4 35.06 73.80** 67.20** 
 
(128.3) (103.7) (128.5) (29.26) (27.49) 
age squared -11.95 -19.80 -5.166 -11.12** -10.34** 
 
(19.64) (15.88) (19.66) (4.587) (4.236) 
foreigners 0.261 0.370*** 0.260 0.177 0.264 
 
(0.209) (0.117) (0.194) (0.186) (0.189) 
roster  -49.85 -29.97 -53.08* -73.75*** -65.24** 
 
(39.30) (26.68) (30.08) (28.23) (27.12) 
roster sq.  7.160 4.206 7.708* 10.85** 9.469** 
 
(5.915) (4.022) (4.575) (4.250) (4.089) 
18_teams -0.223 -0.175 0.184 -0.062 -0.182 
 
(0.259) (0.239) (0.271) (0.244) (0.212) 
                                                          
8 The discussion  about exogeneity of our instruments is postponed to the results’ section. 
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constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Team FE YES YES YES 
  Observations 212 212 167 212 212 
Teams 33 33 26 33 33 
Seasons 14 14 14 14 14 
R-Sq. Within 0.120 0.694 0.192 
  Hansen Test df 
   
46 182 
Hansen Test (Chi-Sq.) 
   
26.67 23.29 
log_alt: Diff.-in-Hansen Test 
(Chi-Sq.) 
   
1.33 1.26 
log_ext: Diff.-in-Hansen Test 
(Chi-Sq.)       0.23 0.97 
AR(1) test (p-value) 
   
0.013 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value)    0.494 0.371 
All variables are logged. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, unless otherwise specified in model 
specification column. Model (1) to (4) include a constant term. * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
The first column includes a standard Fixed-Effect estimation, including team-
specific fixed-effect; columns (2) and (3) include PSAR1 specifications; columns (4) 
and (5) show results of the System-GMM models, modelling covariates respectively 
as exogenous and endogenous. As the table shows, the real wages are always 
positively and significantly associated to sport success, in all estimated models. 
More specifically, a one percent increase in real_wages is associated to an increase 
in seasonal performance ranging from 0.56% to 0.59% in the fixed-effect models. 
The increase is substantially higher in the System-GMM specifications, when 
endogeneity is fully accounted, ranging from 0.63% to 0.83%.  
This result confirms the existing literature on the relationship between payroll 
and seasonal performance, while providing a stronger contribution for it control for 
the dynamic features of the relationship as well as for endogeneity (in columns 4 
and 5), through the inclusion of exogenous instrumental variables. This point is 
worth stressing by inspecting the diagnostic statistics for columns (4) and (5) 
provided at the bottom of Table 4. Firstly, the autocorrelation tests confirm that the 
dynamic pattern of the model is correctly specified: in fact, the null hypothesis of  
absence of autocorrelation is rejected, as expected for AR(1), while the p-values 
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associated to the AR(2) tests confirm that the null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected, hence two-period lags are good instruments.9  
As for thee excluded instruments (i.e. log_alt and log_ext), the chi-square statistics 
of the Hansen tests reported in the bottom of Table 4 consistently confirm the 
exogeneity of the instruments (none of these statistics is significant at conventional 
levels), both when considered along with the full set of covariates and endogenous 
instruments (in column 5) and when they are considered individually: the Diff-in-
Hansen tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for both log_alt and 
log_ext. 
Therefore, Table 4 provides a striking result: our main explanatory variable of 
interest, namely real_wages, is always positively and significantly associated to 
seasonal performance, and this result is robust to different model specifications and 
estimation techniques. Furthermore, the results are strengthened by the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable: even controlling for potential inertia of the 
outcome variable, wage remains a strongly significant predictor of sport success.  
Regarding the covariates included in our models, some remarks are worth stressing. 
Firstly, the negative sign associated to aristocracy, (in the FE and PCSE model 
specifications, when the coefficient is statistically significant) suggests that being 
part of the Italian football’s aristocracy has been detrimental in terms of seasonal 
performances. This contrasts with previous empirical research that considers the 
aristocracy a key factor to be a top team in Serie A in the long run.  
Interestingly, when the dynamics of sport success are fully accounted and 
controlled for in the System-GMM models, the effect associated to aristocracy fades 
out becoming not statistically different from zero. On the contrary, our estimations 
outline a ‘convergence process’ among Italian teams with different traditions, 
opening to new opportunities for ‘rising stars’ teams. Secondly, in the System-GMM 
model specifications, age is found to be non-linearly associated to success, according 
to an inverted-U shaped relationship, implying that average age increases sport 
performance (for instance due to experience, training and learning) up to a 
maximum threshold, when the increase in age turns to be detrimental. This 
                                                          
9 First-order autocorrelation cannot be excluded instead, consistently with the dynamic framework of 
the model: we actually expect that sport success is serially (first-order) correlated. See, among 
others, Roodman (2007). 
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threshold in our estimated models spans from 26 (column 5) to 27 (column 4).10 This 
relationship is consistent with prevailing empirical results and reflects a potential 
non-linear association also between talent and age: when a team is relying on too 
young or too old players, on average, it is signalling, ceteris paribus, a smaller 
availability for talent's remuneration, which typically reaches its top with a player's 
maturity and then decreases in the final part of his professional career. Finally, 
foreigners is significant only in one model specification, although its coefficient 
always appears with the expected positive sign, while roster's size is found to be 
significantly and non-linearly associated to success only in columns 3 to 5. 
To provide a robustness check of our results, we rerun all our models 
specifications adopting an alternative measure of seasonal performance, 
represented by ln_points_pct. Table 5 reports the results.  
 
Table 5- Robustness check. An alternative measure of sport perfomance. 
Dep. Var: log_points_pct (2001/02 - 2014/15) 
Model FE PCSE SYS-GMM 
Specification 
 
PSAR1 PSAR1- FD exog. endog. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
real_wages 0.141** 0.130*** 0.118** 0.101 0.174*** 
 
(0.064) (0.043) (0.052) (0.084) (0.039) 
lagged dep. var. 0.090 0.062 -0.285*** 0.258* 0.336*** 
 
(0.092) (0.119) (0.100) (0.151) (0.088) 
aristocracy -0.206** -0.206*** -0.390** 0.066 0.016 
 
(0.084) (0.055) (0.174) (0.043) (0.028) 
age 5.415 15.02 -12.45 11.67* 11.47** 
 
(25.39) (22.22) (26.59) (6.218) (5.682) 
age squared -0.792 -2.274 1.983 -1.708* -1.761** 
 
(3.887) (3.395) (4.060) (0.969) (0.865) 
foreigners 0.0470 0.0703*** 0.0325 0.0303 0.0491 
 
(0.041) (0.022) (0.032) (0.044) (0.040) 
roster  -8.843 -5.621 -10.37* -12.35** -11.48** 
 
(7.788) (5.378) (5.509) (5.980) (5.645) 
roster sq.  1.268 0.793 1.511* 1.807** 1.657* 
 
(1.172) (0.812) (0.837) (0.898) (0.847) 
18_teams -0.054 -0.038 0.059 -0.009 -0.043 
                                                          
10 The threshold, age*, is simply the maximum of the non-linear function, which is calculated as 
follows: 𝑎𝑔𝑒∗ = 𝑒
(−
?̂?3
2?̂?4
)
 where  ?̂?3 and  ?̂?4 are the estimated coefficients respectively associated to the 
linear and non-linear terms of age. 
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(0.051) (0.046) (0.063) (0.052) (0.047) 
constant YES YES YES 
  Team FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 212 212 167 212 212 
Teams 33 33 26 33 33 
Seasons 14 14 14 14 14 
R-Sq. Within 0.130 0.911 0.211 
  Total number of instruments 
   
46 183 
Hansen Test (Chi-Sq.) 
   
27.11 21.79 
log_alt: Diff.-in-Hansen Test (Chi-Sq.) 
  
3.60 0.14 
log_ext: Diff.-in-Hansen Test (Chi-Sq.)     2.92 0.05 
AR(1) test (p-value) 
   
0.014 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value)    0.268 0.123 
All variables are logged. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses, unless otherwise specified in model 
specification column. Model (1) to (4) include a constant term. * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
 
The use of an alternative dependent variable confirms the robustness of the 
estimated relationship between aggregate wage and sport success, since all but one 
coefficients are statistically significant. In particular, the coefficients of real_wages 
are smaller, due to the different dependent variable, implying an increase in 
seasonal performance ranging from 0.12% to 0.17% when real_wages increase by 
1%. Again, the diagnostic statistics for the System-GMM specifications confirm the 
validity of our excluded instrumental variables, supporting our identification 
strategy. A further evidence about the strength of our results is given by the 
magnitude and direction of the covariates’ coefficients.  
The results of the System-GMM specifications highlight two major differences 
with the FE estimations. Firstly, the magnitude of the coefficients of wage is 
sensibly larger when performance is measured by 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘. Similarly, the coefficients of 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 _𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡 are larger as well, although within a more similar range than FE 
estimates (around .2%). Secondly, 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 is not significant in the System-GMM 
specifications, while it is in the FE models, implying that tradition is no more 
relevant as a determinant of sport performance, in contrast with existing literature, 
when the dynamic of seasonal performance are fully modelled and accounted for. 
The interpretation of this results is actually consistent with the fact that in FE 
estimations a negative coefficient of 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 implied that the role of tradition 
fades along time. Yet in the GMM specification the lagged value of success captures 
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a ‘smoothed’ version of tradition. In sum, even after proper instrumentation, payroll 
is the best predictor of success in Italian Serie A and the result is robust to 
alternative model estimation techniques, alternative measures of success, and to 
the inclusion of two exogenous instrumental variables. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigated the relationship between aggregate wage of players and 
sport performance in the Italian top professional football league - Serie A. The 
analysis focused on 14 seasons from 2001/2002 to 2014/2015. We combined 
alternative estimation techniques, in order to test the hypothesis that teams that 
can afford to pay for it succeed in obtaining better performances.  
We first exploited a fixed-effects panel data. We found that payroll is strongly 
and significantly associated to sport success. This result is robust to alternative 
measures of success (rank, wins or points associated), to alternative measures of 
wages and to the inclusion of a set of covariates potentially related to sport 
performance.  
In addition we have addressed the problem of endogeneity. Since current payroll 
can be endogenous in past success, the paper provided a dynamic specification of 
the model. Based on the System-GMM framework, this model includes lagged terms 
of dependent variables and covariates as instruments to control for endogeneity. To 
further strengthen the analysis, we also included alternative exogenous 
instruments to control for geographical/environmental factors and for socio-
economic factors  that could be the actual predictors of success through an indirect 
effect on payroll. The results from the second step’s analysis confirmed and 
strengthened the findings: aggregate wage expenditure is a robust predictor of 
performance and success for Italian professional football teams.  
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